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movement of the 1960s, demonstrates that it need not be. Putting contemporary men’s 
rights activism in conversation with feminist theory and praxis, this essay explores 
points of ideological convergence between the two movements, demonstrates the 
potential for partnership, and suggests further avenues of scholarly research on 
contemporary men’s rights activism. Attempting to better understand MRAs and their 
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feminism that is truly committed to dismantling patriarchal ideology. 
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Introduction  
Those familiar with the feminist blogosphere will likely be familiar with the 
acronym MRA, which stands for men’s rights activist. “Men’s Rights Activists Don’t 
Deserve the Benefit of the Doubt” (Baker, 2012) and “Rape and Death Threats: What 
Men’s Rights Activists Really Look Like” (Baker, 2013) read the headlines of two recent 
articles on Jezebel.com, a popular feminist blog. MRAs are the subject of scorn and 
ridicule and the butts of jokes, like this 2009 Feministe.com headline: “Feminism: Not 
a Religion. Men’s Rights Activists: Still not Getting Laid Much” (Filipovic, 2009).  
In academia, feminists and gender studies scholars have been writing about 
men’s rights activism and the men’s movement for decades.  Today, when feminist 1
writers decry MRAs, they are referring to a loose network of bloggers and Internet 
activists who post on MRA forums such as those found on Reddit.com, as well as so-
called fathers’ rights activists who belong to organizations such as Dads Against 
Discrimination. The MRAs of this type are based primarily in English-speaking 
western nations and rally around issues such as sexual and domestic violence against 
men, sexual double standards, and the perceived social destruction wrought by 
feminism.  
Interacting with MRAs is not something most feminists enjoy. In the words of 
sociologist Robert Menzies (2007), reflecting on the material he encountered on MRA 
message boards while doing research, “For feminists, pro-feminists, and anyone else 
with a pain threshold, these men’s rights cyber-sites can be arduous territories to 
negotiate. The seemingly endless torrent of hostility, petulance, propaganda, and 
downright hate-mongering that cascades from these virtual pages is hard to digest” (p. 
82). On the other hand, a cursory glance at one of the largest sites of Internet men’s 
rights activism, the /r/MensRights subreddit reveals considerable similarity between 
 For example, Kay Leigh Hagan (1992).  1
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feminism and MRA ideology, most notably in their mutual rejection of traditional 
gender norms.    2
MRAs appear to be mostly white, but beyond that, it is difficult to assess their 
demographic composition. A number of men’s rights subreddits recently conducted a 
survey of their members. Although the Google document containing the survey results 
has since been removed, its contents were recorded and analyzed by an atheist blogger 
named Stephanie Zvan (2014). Of the 3,000 Redditors who had responded at the time 
of Zvan’s writing, 98% were white and 98% were male, and 87% fell in the 17-20 age 
range. 94% identified as atheist and 84% as “strongly conservative.” There are obviously 
issues with this data: the sample was self-selecting, which means it might not be 
representative of the actual MRA Reddit community. It is also possible that some of 
the responses were actually from anti-MRA “trolls” (Internet slang for someone being 
intentionally inflammatory), as the survey seems to confirm the stereotype of MRAs as 
spoiled young white men with little life experience. That “fathers’ rights” issues such as 
divorce and child custody disputes are such an enormous topic of conversation in 
subreddits like /r/MensRights, despite the fact that the majority of white males 
between the ages of 17 and 20 are neither married nor have children, augments this 
possibility. Finally, even if these data are accurate, there is no reason to assume that the 
Reddit MRA population is representative of the entire MRA population. Unfortunately, 
there exist very few additional sources of quantitative information on MRA 
demography. I will discuss in further detail the difficulties in defining the 
contemporary MRA movement, both demographically and in terms of ideology, later 
on in this essay.   
  This paper’s title, “Finding Common Ground,” reflects the belief that men’s 
rights activists and feminists have more in common than either may believe. Its 
intended audience does not include members of the men’s rights movement who 
 Founded in 2005, Reddit.com is a social networking and content-sharing website. Members, called Redditors, can 2
create and join thematic communities called subreddits and vote on content. The Men’s Rights subreddit, /r/
MensRights, was founded in 2008 and is moderated by a panel of ten Redditors. As of the time of this writing, well 
over 100-thousand Redditors subscribe to /r/MensRights. Related subreddits, as indicated on the /r/MensRights 
homepage, include /r/mensrightslaw, /r/LadyMRAs, /r/MRActivism, /r/FeMRA, and /r/MensRants.  
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believe that rape is a made-up crime, or that feminism is an ideology of hate, akin to 
Nazism, or any number of the more extreme men’s rights talking points. Nor does it 
include feminists who have no interest in examining how patriarchal gender ideology 
hurts men. The aims of this paper are to explore the historical and ideological 
intersections between feminist theory and men’s rights activism; to address and dispel 
common MRA charges against feminism; to suggest further avenues of historical and 
sociological research into men’s rights activism; and, above all, to demonstrate the 
potential for partnership between feminists and those members of the men’s rights 
movement who are genuinely interested in challenging gender norms.  
Feminism and the Men’s Movement: Theory and History  
Even absent of any in-depth analysis of Internet men’s rights activism, a quick 
glance at the /r/MensRights subreddit makes clear that many of the issues raised and 
arguments made by internet MRAs intersect with feminism.  When MRAs criticize the 
assumption that women make better parents than men or that women cannot commit 
sexual abuse, what they are really doing is criticizing patriarchal gender ideology, an 
ideology that feminists also reject. In fact, men’s rights activism and feminism share a 
long, complex, and intertwined past. The following section is a brief outline of some of 
the main tenets of contemporary feminist ideology, especially where it intersects with 
men’s rights activism, and a historical overview of the men’s movement, leading into a 
description of the type of men’s rights activism to which feminists today object.   
First, some notes on terminology. In her paper “Theorising Patriarchy” (1989), 
feminist theorist Sylvia Walby, after discussing the history of the term, defines 
patriarchy as “a system of social structures and practices in which men dominate, 
oppress, and exploit women” (p. 214). This is similar to feminist theorist and cultural 
critic bell hooks’ definition of patriarchy as “a political-social system that insists that 
males are inherently dominating, superior to anything and everything deemed weak, 
especially females, and endowed with the right to dominate and rule over the 
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weak” (2004, p. 18). It is important to note that these two definitions’ focus on 
structural and institutional power—net power, if you will—negates the idea that “every 
individual man is in a dominant position and every individual woman in a subordinate 
one” (Walby, 1989, p. 214). Indeed, within patriarchal societies, it is possible for women 
to occupy positions of dominance over men. This point is especially salient when we 
take into account racial and other forms of inequality, such that it is difficult to claim 
that a wealthy white female CEO is socially disadvantaged relative to an impoverished 
black man. When feminists talk about patriarchy, they are talking about widespread 
behavioral patterns, beliefs, and imagery, as well as modes of production, governance, 
and social regulation.  
I have already used the terms “traditional gender ideology” and “patriarchal 
gender ideology.” This paper uses the two interchangeably. Paraphrasing social 
psychologists Susan Fiske and Peter Glick, Paul Eastwick et al. (1996) define traditional 
gender ideology as “a preference for the conventional division of labor between male 
providers and female homemakers and for the associated patriarchal system that cedes 
more power and status to the male provider” (p. 604). Patriarchal gender ideology 
requires that men be strong, dominant, and aggressive—the qualities of a head-of-
household, head-of-state, boss, or leader. Gender studies literature makes frequent use 
of the related term “hegemonic masculinity,” developed, refined, and popularized most 
famously by R.W. Connell, which refers to the form of masculinity most honored 
within a given time and place. Multiple masculinities (e.g. various racialized and queer 
masculinities) may exist simultaneously in any social context, but all are subordinate to 
the hegemonic, normative form (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005, p. 842).  In this 3
context, I consider hegemonic masculinity as that which most fully embodies the 
patriarchal male gender norms I described.  
Feminism is often posited as the belief that men and women should be 
accorded equal rights, or that men and women are equal in worth, or that women 
 The title of this paper is “Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept,” suggesting, of course, that the 3
concept of hegemonic masculinity has undergone considerable revision since it was first proposed. The definition I 
give here is Connell’s original definition, which I believe is adequate in the context of this paper. 
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should have choices in life. The latter is most fully manifested in the form of so-called 
choice feminism, a term coined by Linda Hirschman that has come to mean an 
apolitical approach to feminism that privileges individual “choice” over a critical 
analysis of patriarchal inequality (Ferguson, 2010). Although choice and legal equality 
are part of feminism, the vast majority of feminist theorists would consider such 
definitions simplistic and lacking. Instead, the definition they offer would be 
something more like that of bell hooks, who defines feminism as “a movement to end 
sexism, sexist exploitation, and oppression” (hooks, 2004, p. viii). This definition could 
be expanded to include patriarchy, which is sexist exploitation, oppression, and sexism 
institutionalized. At its core, feminism is about challenging patriarchy.  
 This paper uses the term “contemporary feminism” in an attempt to 
acknowledge feminism’s long and complicated past—a past far too long and 
complicated to do justice to here. I do, however, want to make clear that while all 
strains of feminism since the 1960s and ‘70s have been united around an opposition to 
patriarchy, feminism has evolved significantly over the past decades. In the ‘70s, for 
example, some feminists chose to break all ties with men, practicing either celibacy or 
lesbianism. These women were called feminist separatists or lesbian separatists.  Today, 
very few feminists—including those in academia, who bear the brunt of the worst 
feminist stereotypes—would advocate for completely separating from men as a 
political act. It is thus prudent to recognize separatist feminism as an important part of 
feminism’s past, while also recognizing that feminist theory and praxis today does not 
correspond with some of the more extreme factions of 1970s feminists.   
 My definition of contemporary feminist theory is based on the kind of feminist 
writing routinely published in left-wing print and online publications like The Nation, 
PolicyMic.com, and Mother Jones, as well as Bitch Magazine, Feministing.com, The 
Feminist Wire, and other explicitly feminist print and online sources. It is the kind of 
feminist writing routinely published in academic journals like Signs. This kind of 
feminism – influenced strongly by theorists such as Rebecca Walker (1992), who 
helped popularize the term “third-wave,” and bell hooks – attempts to address 
women’s issues holistically, taking into account the unique forms of sexism 
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experienced by women of color and women belonging to other marginalized groups 
(albeit with mixed success).   Following post-structural feminist theorists such as 4
Judith Butler, it rejects simple, binary constructions of gender (men/women, male/
female) and the idea of a common or global “sisterhood.”  
What else do contemporary feminists believe? In general, contemporary 
feminist philosophy takes a social constructionist view of gender, rejecting biological 
determinism (Campbell, 2002, p. 451; Lindenmeyer, 2002, pp. 46-47). The idea that sex 
and gender are not synonymous concepts is almost universally accepted among 
contemporary feminists and gender theorists.  Put simply, sex refers to the biological 5
differences between men and women (i.e. hormonal, chromosomal, and genital 
differences) and gender to the legal status of someone as male or female and the set of 
cultural expectations surrounding that status (Lorber and Moore, 2007, p. 5; Rider, 
2005, p. 21; Best, 2002, p. 220). As gender scholar Shira Tarrant (2006) puts it, “we might 
come into this world with a penis or a vagina, but we’re not born wanting to fix things 
with a hammer or carry a purse” (p. 6).  
Biological gender essentialism has historically been used to justify gender 
inequality to the detriment of women. For example, pseudo-scientific theories about 
female-male brain size differences have been held as “proof” of women’s inferior 
intellect (Heyman and Giles, 2006, p. 295). On the other hand, some gender essentialist 
theory attributes to women socially desirable traits such as an innate orientation 
toward peace-making and relationship-preservation. In either case, gender 
essentialism is generally rejected by contemporary feminism because of how easily it 
can be used to justify the relegation of women’s autonomy through benevolent sexism, 
a form of sexism that, as opposed to more hostile, aggressive forms, “encompasses 
subjectively positive (for the sexist) attitudes toward women in traditional roles: 
protective paternalism, idealization of women, and desire for intimate relations” (Glick 
and Fiske, 1997, p. 119). For example, the idea that women are, by nature, innocent and 
 This is called an intersectional approach. See Judy Aulette et al, 2009, p. 5. 4
 For discussion of a few notable exceptions, see Lindenmeyer, 2002, p. 47; Best, 2002, p. 220; Coltrane, 1994, p. 5
45. In addition, some poststructural feminists argue that sex, in addition to gender, is constructed. 
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in need of male protection can be seen as justification for male control and 
domination. The idea that women are more spiritually “pure” than men can be seen as 
proof that they are more suited for the domestic sphere (in which, conveniently, work 
is generally unpaid) than the competitive, rough, masculine-driven public sphere.  
Few feminists would argue that there are not some basic male-female sexual 
differences: male-sexed bodies have penises, female-sexed bodies, vaginas; male-sexed 
bodies contain more testosterone, female-sexed bodies, more estrogen; male-sexed 
bodies are generally taller, female-sexed bodies, generally shorter.  Aside from these 6
physical distinctions, however, contemporary feminist theory holds that men and 
women are essentially more alike than they are different—especially psychologically.  7
Women are no “purer” than men, no inherently kinder or more pro-social. I continue 
to emphasize the words “innate” and “inherent” to indicate that while contemporary 
feminists generally reject the notion of a biological basis for female-male behavioral 
differences, this does not mean that they deny the existence of socially constructed 
gender differences. In other words, they hold that female-male behavioral differences, 
while a social reality, can be traced to socialization rather than biology.   8
The implications of this belief are far-reaching. If men and women are 
inherently the same, there is no reason that women should not be expected to take on 
the same responsibilities as men, and men as women. In regard to parenting, this 
means that men should contribute to the care of offspring, not just by generating an 
income, but by doing traditional “mothering” activities like playing with, bathing, and 
putting to bed their kids.  In cases of spousal separation, they should be entitled to the 9
same parental rights as mothers (Silverstein, 1996, pp. 8-9; Levit, 1996, pp. 1074-79). 
 It is important to note here, however, that someone with a biologically male body can identify as a woman and 6
someone with a biologically female body as a man. Again, because sex and gender are not synonymous, some 
women can have penises, some men vaginas. 
 A less extreme version of this argument might hold that biological distinctions are accountable for some behavioral 7
differences between men and women (for example, men’s higher testosterone levels might be in part responsible for 
higher male aggression), but that these essential differences are greatly exaggerated and influenced by cultural 
conditioning, and the link between biology and behavior is not clear-cut. See Mackie, 1983, pp. 76-77.
 This is similar to how many anthropologists hold that “race” is a biologically obsolete concept, but still a social 8
reality that affects people’s habitus and lives.  
 For example, Silverstein (1996); Ehrsenhaft (1998); and Medzian (1992). 9
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They should not be expected, by virtue of their gender alone, to do women special 
favors like pay for dinner, buy fancy gifts, defend women’s “honor” (which itself is a 
gendered concept), or hold open doors.  
Just as it rejects biological gender essentialism, contemporary feminism rejects 
compulsory gender roles and traditional gender ideology, which holds that men are (or 
should be) strong, dominant, and aggressive, and women are (or should be) weak, 
submissive, and meek. The social and economic costs incurred by women in a 
patriarchal society are enormous, but there are a few seeming benefits. For example, 
women are generally treated less harshly than men for certain crimes, such as statutory 
rape, both legally and socially—socially in the sense that male-victim/female-predator 
sex crimes are often joked about as instances of men (or underage boys, in the case of 
statutory rape) “getting lucky.” Contemporary mainstream feminists reject this sort of 
differential treatment on two grounds: it is unethical (obviously), and it perpetuates 
dangerous ideas about supposedly innate female-male social characteristics. As 
feminist legal scholar Nancy Levit (1996) argues, “punishing only men for statutory 
rape reinforces the model of males as aggressors and affords women “protection” 
while denying them sexual freedom” (p. 1052) which is further detrimental to women 
because “social acceptance of male aggression may be reinforced by rape laws that 
presume a woman's consent to intercourse in the absence of her resistance” (p. 1056). 
Levit’s argument is that the American legal system’s assumption of male 
hypersexuality and aggression is detrimental to women as well as men because it 
upholds gender essentialist ideals that have historically been used to justify female 
subservience.  Reflecting on his education at an evangelical Christian high school, 
ethicist Patrick D. Hopkins (1998) recalls learning that male hypersexuality meant men 
were more susceptible to getting “caught up in the moment.” It was girls’ 
responsibility, therefore, to “resist physical contact or suggestive behavior that might 
inflame their suitors” (p. 35). Again, we see how the patriarchy-based assumption of 
male hypersexuality calls into question men’s capacity for self-control. Disparate 
treatment of men and women for sexual offenses has its roots in this assumption.  
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Overall, contemporary feminist theory holds that gender is a social construct—
that gender is a product of socialization, something that is cultivated and learned. It 
rejects traditional gender ideology, which assumes men to be naturally rough, tough, 
and sexually aggressive, and women to be passive, caring, and good. And, for the most 
part, it rejects differential legal and social treatment of men and women based on such 
ideology. Very few contemporary feminists would argue that women make naturally 
better parents than men; that it is acceptable for women to sexually and physically 
harass and insult men; or that women deserve special treatment socially and under the 
law.  
The feminist rejection of gender essentialism and traditional gender norms is 
intertwined with the ideology of a movement that emerged in the 1960s and ’70s: the 
men’s liberation movement. Led by writers such as Joseph H. Pleck, Jack Sawyer, and 
Jon Snodgrass, men’s liberationists brought to light the ways in which traditional 
gender norms negatively affect men socially and psychologically, an issue that was 
expanded upon in the 1980s and ’90s (and continuing today) by R.W. Connell, Michael 
Kimmel, and others. As Sawyer put it in 1970, “male liberation calls for men to free 
themselves of the sex-role stereotypes that limit their ability to be human” (p. 170). By 
and large, adherents to this strand of the men’s movement were and are pro-feminist. 
As Pleck and Sawyer wrote in Men and Masculinity (1974), an anthology that includes 
an article by Gloria Steinem, “women’s liberation also holds incidental benefits for 
men” by questioning traditional gender norms (p. 2). Men’s liberationists understood 
that women suffer most under patriarchy, but they also recognized that unyielding 
notions of socially acceptable male/female behavior limit men’s options for self-
expression. This dual recognition is articulated beautifully by writer and anti-sexual 
harassment activist Michael Kaufman (1994): 
Men enjoy social power and many forms of privilege by virtue of being 
male. But the way we have set up that world of power causes immense pain, 
isolation, and alienation not only for women but also for men. This is not to 
equate men's pain with the systemic and systematic forms of women's 
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oppression. Rather, it is to say that men's worldly power… comes with a 
price for us (p. 142).   
The price Kaufman refers to includes the inability express emotion, the repression of 
homosexual desires, and unrealistic expectations of physical strength and financial 
success. The idea that rigid gender norms negatively affect both men and women is 
what Kenneth Clatterbaugh (1996) calls the “socialization argument” and formed the 
basis of the 1970s male liberation movement (pp. 297-99). Today, pro-feminist men’s 
studies scholars—the heirs to the male liberationists of the 1960s and ’70s— occupy a 
prominent place in academia.  10
 Patriarchal gender ideology takes a physical as well as emotional toll on men. In 
Politics of Masculinities: Men in Movements (1997), pro-feminist men’s studies scholar 
Michael Messner describes his father’s sudden death from cancer in 1977. “As a high 
school college and football player in the 1930s and 1940s, then in the navy in World 
War II, he had been taught that a real man ignores his own pain,” Messner writes of 
his father, a man who “prided himself that he had never let a little cold or flu or a sore 
back keep him from work.” When he began to notice signs that there was something 
wrong, he ignored them—and by the time he saw a doctor, it was too late. Messner sees 
his father’s story “as paradigmatic of the story of men in general” (pp. 5-6). The 
masculine ideal men are expected to live up to encourages them to ignore medical 
warning signs and physical pain, engage in risky behavior, and consume alcohol and 
tobacco at higher rates than do women. Like Kaufman, Messner is not arguing here 
that women oppress men or that men suffer more than women, but rather that the 
patriarchal social expectation of male hardiness and strength has very negative 
consequences for men.  
 Obviously, not all strands of the men’s movement are profeminist. Today’s 
MRAs certainly are not. I now turn my attention to the ideological roots of the 
contemporary MRA movement. MRA organizations began appearing in the early 
 Michael Kimmel, Kenneth Clatterbaugh, Michael Kaufman, Michael Messner, and R.W. Connell are a few of the 10
most famous men’s studies scholars.
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1970s, with the 1971 Coalition of American Divorce Reform Settlements and the 1973 
Men’s Rights Association. Sociologist Judith Newton (2005) calls the MRA movement a 
“spinoff” of the men’s liberation movement (p. 190). It was a spinoff in that the sense 
that both movements were premised on the belief that traditional gender roles hurt 
men. What distinguished MRAs from male liberationists was their denial of structural 
inequality between men and women and their attempts to divert blame for their 
problems away from patriarchy. Herb Goldberg’s 1976 The Hazards of Being Male was 
one of the first books to argue that patriarchal gender norms (though he did not see 
them as patriarchal) hurt men just as much as or more than they hurt women. A more 
recent example of a prominent MRA writer is Warren Farrell, author of The Myth of 
Male Power (1993). Incredibly, Farrell cites the fact that women shop more than men 
and the fact that more men than women work outside the domestic sphere as evidence 
of male persecution. Although Farrell claims to support feminism, his all-but denial of 
men’s historical and present-day economic, social, and political power over women 
sullies his feminist credentials. Today, Farrell is a hero of the men’s rights movement; 
The Myth of Male Power is on the “Suggested Reading” list of the /r/MensRights 
homepage. Men like Goldberg and Farrell shared with men’s liberation activists an 
ideological rejection of patriarchal gender ideology, but without knowing it. They are 
the forebears of today’s MRA movement.  
 Sociologist Jocelyn Elise Crowley has written extensively about a loose network 
of what are known as fathers’ rights activists (whom I will call FRAs), whose adherents 
belong to organizations such as Dads Against Discrimination, the National Congress 
for Fathers and Children, and the Children’s Rights Council. FRAs believe that fathers 
are discriminated against in divorce proceedings, custodial disputes, and the child 
support system. Some FRAs want to abolish the child support system, whereas others 
“demand more moderate adjustments, such as a reworking of the formulas used to 
calculate the awards, increased tax breaks for paying on time, and the introduction of 
“accountability systems” (such as debit cards) so that they can verify that all monies are 
being spent on their children instead of on their former partners” (Crowley, 2009, p. 
332). The philosophy behind the FRA movement is valid: equally fit, loving parents 
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should have equal custodial rights in the case of family breakdown, regardless of 
gender. However, what many father’s rights organizations and activists seem to 
discredit is the fact that women continue to do the majority of childcare and 
household labor. That the issue of child custody and alleged discrimination against 
fathers occupies such a central role in MRA discourse, as I have noted, suggests that 
FRAs are a subgroup of MRAs.   
 In the early 1990s, around the time Farrell was working on The Myth of Male 
Power, men across the United States began to go on weekend retreats to connect with 
other men and get in touch with their primal, masculine energy. Inspired by the work 
of poet Robert Bly, they believed that American men had become overly domesticated, 
sensitive, and alienated from their essential “maleness”—the part of men that is 
adventurous, brave, wild. They formed what is called the mythopoetic men’s 
movement, and their weekend retreats consisted of drumming, chanting, crying, and 
hugging, and taking part in male bonding rituals (as well as, according to Michael 
Kimmel, pretending to be animals) (Newton, 2005, p. 139; Kimmel, 1995, p. 2). 
Mythopoets, who were mostly middle-aged, white, middle-class, and heterosexual, 
relied heavily on Jungian psychology and the appropriation of indigenous, non-
western mythology and ritual to make the case that it was essential for modern men to 
break away from their mothers and be “initiated” into manhood (Newton, p. 141; 
Kimmel and Kaufman, 1995, pp. 18-19, 21, 24, 28-31). 
 The mythopoetic movement, which has all but died out, was fairly complex. On 
the one hand, the mythopoets were not explicitly anti-feminist, and their willingness 
to be emotional and vulnerable in front of their peers is an obvious break from 
standard patriarchal gender ideology (Newton, 2005, p. 140). According to Newton, they 
were “largely liberal,” politically (p. 7). On the other hand, there was something deeply 
conservative about the mythopoetic movement, especially in its essentialist ideas about 
men and women, the idea of some sort of innate “male” energy (Clatterbaugh, 1995, 
pp. 49-51; Kimmel and Kaufman, 1995, p. 25). Additionally, Kimmel reports 
encountering a lot of “undiluted rage against mothers” among mythopoets, who 
accused their wives of conspiring to keep them from their kids—an obvious 
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connection with FRAs (p. 7). 
 Writing in 1993, Kenneth Clatterbaugh recognized the similarities between 
mythopoetic discourse and that of men’s rights activists such as Farrell, most notably 
in that both downplayed the existence of men’s institutionalized power (Clatterbaugh, 
pp. 56-57). There were also some differences. For example, both movements offered as 
evidence of male persecution a list of “wounds” that afflict men. But in keeping with 
the mythopoetic fascination with mythology, Jungian philosophy, and spirituality, 
mythopoets’ list of wounds tended to be abstract—the “mother wound” (men 
emotionally distancing themselves from men), the “father wound” (poor relationships 
between fathers and sons) (Clatterbaugh, p. 56; Kimmel and Kaufman, pp. 22-27). 
MRAs, on the other hand, focused their attention on visible, measurable phenomena, 
such as men’s shorter life spans and deaths in combat (both of which can be traced to 
the expectations placed on men by patriarchal gender ideology, but this, of course, 
went unnoticed by MRAs) (Clatterbaugh, p. 56).   
 Furthermore, MRA discourse tended and tends, like feminism, to reject 
patriarchal notions of gender essentialism. Farrell’s The Myth of Male Power cites the 
mandatory draft of males as an example of male persecution. Although Farrell 
conveniently avoids the fact that men, by and large, are the ones who wage war—
which was especially true during the Vietnam War, the last time the United States 
actually made use of the draft—his argument is not entirely absurd. In an ideal world, 
patriarchal gender ideology – which encourages male violence, positions men as the 
leaders and protectors of the home and nation, and perpetuates gender essentialist 
notions of female passivity and male aggression – would not dictate American public 
policy. Farrell misses the mark by failing to incorporate an analysis of patriarchy and 
notions of gender essentialism into his argument, but his argument cannot be taken as 
an endorsement of these things, either.  This is in stark contrast with the mythopoets’ 
habit of excusing or endorsing male aggression à la neo-Jungian archetypes (e.g. the 
king-protector) and the belief that men are essentially aggressive (Kimmel, p. 5; 
Clatterbaugh, p. 54).   
 Judging from what I have read of online MRA discourse, today’s MRAs bear little 
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resemblance to the mythopoets of the 1990s: they are not spiritual, they are not 
interested in healing their “mother wounds,” and they do not tend to talk about their 
emotions, except for anger. Indeed, if we are to believe the Reddit data I mentioned 
before, today’s MRAs and the mythopoets have almost nothing in common except for 
their whiteness.  The reason I have gone into detail about the mythopoetic movement, 
then, is to suggest that more work needs to be done on exploring the connections—if 
there are any—between it and the contemporary MRA movement. What has become 
of those ‘90s men, with their drum circles and therapy sessions?  Even if they do not 
call themselves “men’s rights activists,” did their movement influence contemporary 
men’s rights activism at all?  
 These questions speak to a larger problem in the study of contemporary men’s 
rights activism—namely, that there exists shockingly little information about the 
movement, both its demographic composition and its ideology. Feminists who make 
broad statements like “MRAs are just a bunch of white-privileged misogynists” do not 
even know with any certainty whom they are talking about.  Studying the 
contemporary MRA movement requires analytical creativity and informed supposition. 
  
Men’s Rights Activists Today 
 Because there exists so little scholarly information about the contemporary MRA 
movement, most of what we know (or think we know) about it is based upon anecdotal 
evidence and observation. In July 2013, I took a few hundred screenshots of the 
beginnings of /r/MensRightsActivism subreddit threads and attempted to categorize 
them thematically.  This proved difficult, as a huge portion consisted simply of links 11
to fairly value-neutral news articles (e.g. “Single-Fatherhood on the Rise”) with no 
commentary by the poster. Some were stereotypical MRA whining, such as one 
obviously fabricated story from a man who claimed to have innocently held a door 
open for a woman at a pizza restaurant, only to be yelled at (“You think I NEED you to 
hold the door open for me?!”  “No ma’am, I was just raised to be polite.” “That’s what’s 
 All of the following reddit content was pulled from /r/MensRightsActivism and subreddits.11
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wrong with the world today, MEN feel as if women NEED TO HAVE THINGS DONE 
FOR THEM!”), and complaints about false rape accusations. There was also a lot of 
discussion of FRA issues and complaints about feminism, but not everything they 
discussed lacked merit. Many talked about violence against men, especially female-on-
male violence; men’s higher death rates from drug abuse and job-related casualties; 
and female-on-male statutory rape. There were also a few surprises, like a question 
from one poster about whether or not male-only barbershops are unethical because 
they discriminate against women. To me, this suggests a sincere belief in the 
righteousness of gender-neutrality. I was also (pleasantly) surprised to find a link to an 
image of a male washroom with a “changing tables inside” sign, accompanied by the 
commentary, “As a single dad with a young son on a road trip this was a very welcome 
sight.” Although this poster, as an MRA, was probably unaware that men being more 
involved in childcare, including the unpleasant parts like changing diapers, is 
something that feminists have been agitating for for decades, it was heartening to see 
him take an interest in caring for his son. Almost a year later, perusing through the 
same subreddit, I continue to encounter the same mix of discussion topics. 
 The problem is that casually perusing is not a very scientific way of going about 
determining what kinds of topics interest MRAs. Analysts who are well-versed in 
sociological research methodology could learn a lot from conducting a well-designed, 
thorough content analysis, not only of /r/MensRights but also some of the other MRA 
subreddits, like /r/mensrightslaw, /r/MRActivism, and /r/MensRants. Of these, /r/
MensRights is not only the largest, but also very heavily moderated; posters are not 
allowed to refer to women as “bitches” or “cunts,” for example, or even to make 
statements like “Women are disgusting and cannot be trusted” (this is an actual 
example taken from the moderation policy page).   
 In terms of assessing MRA demography, researchers, instead of relying on open-
access surveys, could directly contact posters who have been active MRA subreddit 
users for over a given period of time. This could potentially weed out a lot of anti-MRA 
“trolls” who create accounts just to answer the survey. To assess the demography of the 
MRA movement outside of Reddit, researchers could take a page out of Michael 
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Kimmel, Jocelyn Crowley, Judith Newton, and others who have researched facets of 
the men’s movement by interviewing members of MRA organizations and attending 
MRA meetings and forums. This would also be a good way of determining how the 
topics discussed on MRA subreddits compare or contrast with those in which offline 
MRA organizations are interested.  
 Even within the contemporary MRA movement, there appear to be some 
divisions, or at least degrees of extremism. Men going their own way (MGTOW) are 
MRAs who have taken MRA anti-woman rhetoric to an extreme. Judging from what I 
have seen of MGTOW websites, Facebook.com groups, and subreddits, it is fair to say 
that these men truly hate women. Unfortunately, there exists absolutely no reliable 
information on MGTOW. There are also exists a fairly well-known website called 
ReturnOfKings.com, whose raison d’être is to denounce “sluts” and gay men. Return 
of Kings is run by a blogger named Roosh V., a self-proclaimed professional pick-up 
artist and sexist. It is unclear if Roosh V. and the men who frequent Return of Kings 
consider themselves MGTOW, but their shared hatred of women and belief that 
women are only valuable as sex objects raises that possibility. Unlike many 
contemporary MRAs, the men behind Return of Kings specifically condone gender 
essentialism.  
 Moderate MRAs, those who reject gender essentialism and misogyny, would do 
well to actively, vocally distance themselves from MGTOW and the pickup artist-types 
who align themselves with Return of Kings and other groups like it. Doing so would 
challenge some of the worst MRA stereotypes and strengthen the credibility of the 
movement. For our part, feminists should be wary of grouping together all MRAs and 
ignoring differences of opinion within the movement. It is both unfair and inaccurate 
to draw no distinction between rabidly misogynistic MRAs and their more moderate 
counterparts, even if we believe the latter to be misguided, as I do.  
  The truth is that both MRAs and feminists are guilty of spreading 
misinformation about each other, sometimes unintentionally. I have attempted to 
explain the history, demography, and ideology of the contemporary MRA movement in 
a way that is both sensitive and attentive to nuance. I now turn my attention to 
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addressing some of the most prominent anti-feminist MRA arguments and 
misconceptions, and then to exploring the potential for MRA-feminist reconciliation 
and partnership. 
Anti-Feminist Misconceptions and the Potential for Partnership 
 The idea that women’s studies college courses teach students to hate men is a 
common misconception. Since its introduction into academia in the 1970s, the field of 
women’s studies has undergone many changes. One major change has been an 
increased attempt to encourage male students to take women’s studies courses (Fahs, 
2013, p. 559). Furthermore, professors in the field are often very aware of the 
importance of integrating the studies of masculinity into their curricula, and make 
active attempts to do so.  The addition of “gender” to many women’s studies program 12
names and course titles—e.g. The Department of Women and Gender Studies, Intro to 
Women and Gender Studies—reflects this growing awareness of how the study of men 
fits into the study of women. According to Oakland University professor Jo Reger, 
explaining why the Women’s Studies program at Oakland University changed its name 
to Women and Gender Studies, “We can’t just talk about what makes a woman without 
talking about what makes a man” (Oakland University News Archive, 2008).  
 Many male college students enrolled in women and gender studies (WGS) 
programs report being labeled effeminate or gay by their peers, especially by their 
male peers (Murphy, 2011, pp. 173-75). Not all male students in WGS are gay, but many 
of them are. According to Michael Murphy, a gay male WGS professor, this is because 
WGS courses “offer a space that both affirms gay male students’ life experience and 
helps them develop analytical and political tools for personal empowerment” (p. 176). 
In WGS, gay male students encounter feminist challenges to the gender binary, 
patriarchal gender norms, and gender essentialism. The appeal of such a framework to 
young men who do not fit the straight hegemonic masculine ideal is obvious. So long 
 For example, Gaffney and Manno (2011).  12
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as MRAs consider gay men to be men, academic WGS provides a space for men to 
explore alternatives to heteropatriarchal masculinity.  
 WGS holds benefits even for heterosexual male students. Very few men totally 
live up to the standards of hegemonic masculinity, and as with gay men, WGS 
introduces them to a framework that challenges those harmful standards. According to 
one professor, reflecting on the incorporation of masculinity studies into her college’s 
women’s studies program, “Rather than simply constructing men as the oppressors, it 
allows us to explore the varieties of masculine experience, both hegemonic and non-
hegemonic. This more complicated view of men is in keeping with Women’s Studies 
attempt to account for the diversity of human experience” (Berila et al., 2005, p. 40).   
 The myth that WGS college courses teach hatred of men is itself based on a 
widespread misconception: the idea that feminists hate men. It would be disingenuous 
to claim that feminism does not contain a number of anti-male strains. This was 
especially true in the 1960s and ‘70s. MRAs often cite works like Valerie Solanas’s 1967 
S.C.U.M. Manifesto (S.C.U.M. stands for “Society for Cutting Up Men”) as examples of 
feminist misandry. It is important to keep in mind two things. First, anti-male 
feminists have always been somewhat on the fringes of the movement. (In the case of 
Solanas, it should be noted that she acted entirely alone—S.C.U.M. was a movement of 
one.) Mainstream second-wave feminists such as Gloria Steinem primarily sought to 
gain rights and equality for women, not to destroy men.   
 Second, contemporary feminists do not, by and large, advocate for separatism or 
the rejection of men. This is in large part the result of contributions by black feminists 
such as those who made up the Combahee River Collective, a black lesbian feminist 
organization active during the 1970s. According to the authors of the 1977 “Combahee 
River Collective Statement,” “we reject the stance of Lesbian separatism because it is 
not a viable political analysis or strategy for us. It leaves out far too much and far too 
many people, particularly Black men, women, and children.”  Black feminists knew 
that it was untenable to turn their backs on their brothers, fathers, and sons while they 
suffered under white supremacy. In the words of black feminist Dorothy Roberts 
(1995, 1998), “We are bound to Black men through the day-to-day struggles of living in 
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a racist society” (p. 320). Fighting white supremacy would involve solidarity with, not 
rejection of, men of color.  Contemporary feminism owes its more nuanced 13
understanding of gender relations to feminists of color. 
 Perhaps the best approach to challenging these two misconceptions—that WGS 
courses teach students to hate men and feminism is anti-male—is to look at some 
WGS course syllabi. Doing so gives us a more concrete understanding of 
contemporary feminist theory and praxis. An informal sample of fifteen introductory 
WGS course syllabi demonstrates how different typical WGS courses are from the 
stereotype (see footnote for a description of the sampling methodology used).  Of 14
these fifteen syllabi, ten include readings by Audre Lorde and/or bell hooks, both of 
whose work deals extensively with patriarchy’s destructive effects on men. An 
additional two contain the “Combahee River Collective Statement,” which, as we have 
seen, rejects separatist feminism. Eight include readings by pro-feminist men’s studies 
scholars, including some cited in this paper (specifically, Kimmel, Kaufman, Brod, 
Messner, and Connell). Eleven contain at least one section devoted to exploring gender 
as a social construction and gender and sexual variance through time and space, citing 
poststructural feminist theorists such as Judith Lorber, Anne Fausto-Sterling, and 
Judith Butler. None contain the writings of Andrea Dworkin, the symbol, however 
unfairly, of man-hating feminism—and none contain the S.C.U.M. Manifesto! 
 Admittedly, six of the syllabi cite authors who might fairly be described as hostile 
toward men. I am referring specifically to Adrienne Rich, Catharine MacKinnon, and 
Shulamith Firestone. However, of those six, each contains readings from at least one of 
the following: hooks, Lorde, Kimmel, or Kaufman. It is thus difficult to argue that 
WGS courses assign only work by “anti-male” feminists. Furthermore, assigning a 
particular text should not be taken as a statement of approval of everything that text 
 For a more forceful critique of anti-male feminism, see hooks, “Men: Comrades in Struggle” (2000), pp. 68-70. 13
Here, hooks castigates anti-male feminism as bourgeois and white-supremacist. 
 To make this selection, I searched “WGS introduction syllabus” in Google and then downloaded fifteen course 14
syllabi from the first eight pages of the search results (there were 777,000 results in total). My only selection criteria 
were that the syllabi come from North American post-secondary institutions, that they contain a full, week-by-week 
reading list, and that they pertain to introductory courses that aim to familiarize students with feminist theory and the 
study of gender (as opposed to courses more specific in focus, e.g. “Chicana Feminism” or “Gender in Early Modern 
Europe”).
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contains. It is possible to appreciate feminists like Firestone, Rich, and MacKinnon’s 
contributions to feminist thought without agreeing with them on every front. Even if 
contemporary feminists generally reject these authors’ arguably “anti-male” 
sentiments, their contributions to feminist theory merit recognition. The suggestion 
that assigning these authors counts as misandry reflects a misunderstanding of 
intellectual pursuit.  
 Ultimately, the majority of MRA complaints that I have encountered can be 
traced back to the harmful, limiting, and unrealistic standards to which patriarchal 
gender ideology holds both men and women. This is not to blame everything that is 
wrong in the world on men and men alone. As bell hooks (2004) so passionately 
argues, women, too, perpetuate and sustain patriarchy (p. 24). Women, too, buy into 
patriarchal, gender-essentialist notions about normative male and female behavior. The 
feminist project challenges us, whatever our gender, to question our role in 
maintaining this hierarchical system through our actions, words, and beliefs.    
 It is understandably difficult for MRAs who have been hurt by their ex-partners 
and unfairly denied custody of their children to move beyond simply demonizing 
women as a form of protest, but this is necessary in the quest to create a society in 
which loving, hands-on fatherhood is truly valued. A good place to start would be by 
joining feminists in the fight for guaranteed parental leave in United States —not just 
for mothers, but also for fathers. And if MRAs’ aim is really to fight for fathers, all 
fathers, then they must actively incorporate a racial-justice component into their 
framework and challenge the widespread cultural demonization of black fatherhood. 
These are just two ways in which the fathers’ rights faction of MRAs could become 
more effective and more credible by partnering with feminists and feminist allies.  
 An MRA talking point that I have not yet mentioned is the issue of forced or 
compulsory fatherhood. If a man and a woman conceive a child, the decision to 
continue with the pregnancy and bring that child into the world is entirely the 
mother’s, at least legally. A man cannot force a woman to carry a fetus against her 
wishes; in other words, he cannot force her to become a mother. Why, then, ask MRAs, 
should women be allowed to force fatherhood on men? If a man with no interest in 
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becoming a parent unintentionally impregnates a woman, why should he be forced to 
shell out almost two decades’ worth of child-support payments? Even some feminists 
agree that this is unfair. Philosopher Elizabeth Brake, for instance, has argued that 
“men who impregnate women unintentionally and despite having taken efforts to 
prevent this outcome” have no moral obligation to support their children (Brake, 2005, 
p. 55).  
 I will address this admittedly formidable MRA argument—the argument that 
compulsory fatherhood is unfair to men—by way of Brake, because her writing on the 
subject is grounded in a feminist commitment to bodily sovereignty and is sufficiently 
sophisticated to be taken seriously. There are a few issues with Brake’s intervention. 
First, Brake limits her analysis to the consideration of “the non-resident out-of-
wedlock father whose contraceptives failed during a casual sexual encounter” (p. 56). 
From a purely pragmatic standpoint, it would obviously be difficult to prove in a court 
of law that one impregnated a woman purely as a result of contraceptive failure. More 
importantly, she makes the fallacious assumption that law is necessarily grounded in 
morality, or more precisely, that a moral obligation/non-obligation should directly 
translate into a legal obligation/non-obligation. But law is based not only on “morality,” 
a construction Brake neglects to explicate or define, but also on considerations of 
practicality, utility, and social welfare. Considering that “[m]ore than 42% of single 
mothers with children aged 18 and younger lived in poverty in 2010” (Broussard et al., 
2012, p. 190), it hardly needs saying that allowing men to opt-out of child support 
would result in hordes of children being raised in even more severe conditions of 
economic deprivation than is currently the case. Thus, even if one accepts that a father 
is not “morally” obligated to support his unwanted child, the social costs of allowing 
men to opt out of this legal mandate would be nothing short of disastrous, at least in 
the contemporary North American context of what Gøsta Esping-Andersen calls the 
liberal welfare state. In this welfare state model, individuals and families are rendered 
largely unable to sustain themselves without reliance on the market (low 
decommodification, as Esping-Andersen terms it) and there is a “strong preference for 
private welfare spending” (Arts and Gelissen, 2010, p. 571). What this means, 
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ultimately, is that the state allocates little money to welfare spending, leaving 
individuals to fend for themselves.  
 This is where Brake’s argument has merit. She contends that “the dilemma 
between male support and female poverty is a false one: it overlooks the real, and 
perhaps independently required, alternative of significant state support” (p. 67). 
Instead of forcing low-socioeconomic status men to take on dangerous or undesirable 
jobs in order to make their monthly child support payments, Braker contends “wider 
society” has an obligation to care for single mothers’ children.  In doing so she 15
problematizes the assumption, supported by the liberal welfare model, “that the costs 
of raising children are justly assigned to the individual parents” (p. 69). Brake’s 
emphasis on collective social responsibility as opposed to individualism is typical of 
feminist thought. The vast majority of feminists would agree with Brake when she 
argues for increased public spending on children, alleviating responsibility from 
individual, often low-income, men. I address in further detail feminism’s inextricability 
with collectivist, left-wing ideology below.  
 MRAs who take issue with how male rape victims are not seen as real victims, or 
how female sex offenders are treated more leniently than their male counterparts, 
would be wise to fight against the gender-essentialist notion of male hypersexuality. 
One way to do this is to stop perpetuating the myth that women are to blame for their 
own rapes on the basis that men cannot control their carnal urges. If men always 
desire sex, then female-on-male statutory rape is only a crime on the books, not a 
violation of a young man’s personal autonomy. After all, what teenage boy would not 
want sex with an older, more experienced woman? These are the attitudes that result 
from gender-essentialism, and these are exactly the attitudes that feminists have been 
battling for decades.   
 In addition, MRAs do not help their cause by accusing women of “crying rape” 
 It should be noted that Brake is far from alone among feminists in her sympathy for low-income non-custodial 15
fathers. In an article on the neoliberal welfare state, Canadian feminist political scientist Janine Brodie argues, “the 
federal government’s new child support legislation designed to discipline the so-called deadbeat dad…. a long 
reviled figure in feminist discourse… fails to address the realities of child poverty in Canada. The federal 
government’s own research, for example, indicates that few fathers fit the stereotypical image of the deadbeat 
dad” (2005: 103). 
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after regrettable one-night stands, or any of the number of offensive myths used to 
downplay the urgency of acquaintance rape, especially on college campuses. Before 
feminists started talking about acquaintance rape and the importance of consent, rape 
was thought of as a crime confined to dark alleyways. It was feminists who raised 
awareness of the fact that even seemingly normal, nice men can rape women, and that 
sex is rape in both the presence of a “no” and the absence of clear consent. If brute 
force is a necessary condition of rape—if rape is only rape when it involves ripped 
clothing and bruises to the skin—then female-on-male rape is virtually nonexistent. 
With the exception of a small minority of cases, women do not rape men in the 
stereotypical manner that many MRAs seem to think constitutes as the only form of 
“legitimate” rape, and they never have. Women do not maraud the streets at night 
wearing ski masks, rip men’s clothes off their bodies, and rape them at knifepoint—
and they never have. Women do not barge into men’s houses, tie them up in chairs, 
and rape them, and they never have. It is only when we understand rape according to 
its feminist-inspired definition, as any sex resulting from coercion or in the absence of 
consent, does the potential for female-on-male rape as a numerically significant 
phenomenon emerge. Instead of fighting feminists, MRAs who care about male rape 
victims could partner with feminists to raise awareness about consent, boundaries, and 
ethical sexual conduct. Concern for female victims does not preclude concern for male 
victims.    
 There is no reason, ultimately, that moderate MRAs should feel unwelcome in 
the feminist movement or avoid making strategic partnerships with feminists that 
further their aims. Feminists do not want men to die in war or dangerous jobs like 
mining, to suffer from alcoholism and drug addiction, or to face any of the social ills 
that disproportionately affect men. Early feminists like Shulamith Firestone began 
their activism in the New Left anti-Vietnam movement. For as long as the modern 
women’s movement has existed, feminists have aligned themselves with workers’ 
unions, supported pacifism and governmental regulation of dangerous industries, and 
sought to expand social services. Black feminists such as Angela Davis have done 
tremendous work in bringing attention to the United States government’s racist war 
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on drugs, which has had disastrous effects on the lives of men of color, in particular. 
Feminism is not just about women; it is a social justice project that seeks to dismantle 
unequal power relations across class, race, sexual, and gender lines. Feminist concerns 
concern men, and vice-versa.  
 Thus far, this paper has focused more on feminism’s benefits to men than on 
how men could benefit the feminist movement. Feminist readers might be wondering, 
what’s in it for us? Why should we seek to convince men’s rights activists to join our 
movement? Why should we seek to recruit more male allies?  Admittedly, in 16
discussing the benefits of male participation in feminism, one runs the risk of 
implying that male participation is necessary for the legitimization of the movement. 
Feminism does not require men to be a movement worth listening to—but by the 
same token, male participation helps. For instance, according to philosopher James P. 
Sterba (1998), “there are contexts where men because of their past involvement with 
sexist practices and institutions can be helpful in exposing and critiquing those same 
practices and institutions” (p. 299). Sterba uses the example of hardcore pornography 
(the legality of which was a significant legal debate in the 1990s, with many feminists 
arguing that it should be banned), claiming that men, as the main consumers of 
hardcore pornography, were in a unique position to explain to the public how such 
material warped their sexual tastes. “It is just here,” he says, “that men can well serve 
the cause of feminism by testifying to the destructive impact hardcore pornography 
has had on their relations with women, and, thereby help demonstrate the necessity 
for banning it” (p. 301).  
 Legal debates about pornography aside, there are certainly other areas in which 
feminist men are uniquely able to speak from personal experience about their past 
complicity with sexism. For example, men are more likely than women to be exposed 
to (and take part in) so-called “locker room banter”—chauvinist joking among men, 
often sexual in nature. A male feminist’s reflections on his personal experiences with 
 I should note here that the role of men within the movement is somewhat contentious among feminists. Some 16
(e.g. bell hooks) take no issue with men self-identifying as feminists, and actually encourage it. Others prefer for 
men to self-identify as profeminist or feminist allies. Either way, it is all but undeniable that male allies bring 
visibility and recognition to the movement.  
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this kind of discourse—which is simply obnoxious at its most innocent, and at its 
worst, violent and deeply misogynistic—is in a better position than most women to use 
real-life examples when explaining to other men why sexist speech is harmful. The 
truth is that men respond differently to other men than they do to women. As such, 
men arguably have a responsibility act as educators toward their peers.    17
 Moderate men’s rights’ activists, because of their understanding of how 
traditional gender ideology hurts men, have the potential to be particularly useful 
feminist allies. These are men who have witnessed or experienced direct pain resulting 
from the pressures exerted on them by hegemonic masculinity—the pressure to not 
appear weak or effeminate, the pressure to be strong, to be a leader. Unbeknownst to 
them, they have likely spent more time pondering gender theory than have most other 
men. If they were to replace their misguided anger at women with a more constructive 
analytical framework through which to address these issues, they could make excellent 
feminists.   
Concluding Thoughts 
 As many MRAs as there are who genuinely care about gender equality, there exist 
in equal numbers MRAs who fundamentally distrust and dislike women. I am 
referring to men like those who call themselves MGTOW, who see all women as gold-
diggers, liars, and cheats, men who believe that male-on-female rape is a non-issue or 
something that women somehow bring upon themselves. These are men whom no 
amount of balanced reasoning, social science research, and compassionate discourse 
will touch. As stated, this paper is not for them.   
 That said, feminists and MRAs both stand to gain from exploring the 
intersections between these two movements. Amid all the harsh rhetoric on either 
side, many feminists and MRAs might not know that the men’s rights movement 
actually grew from of the pro-feminist men’s liberation movement of the 1960s and 
 As bell hooks argues in “Men: Comrades in Struggle” (2000), the making of feminist revolution should not be a 17
“sex-role task,” and men must “assume responsibility for actively struggling to end sexist oppression” (p. 68). 
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‘70s. By dismissing MRAs as pathetic misogynists, as many feminists do, feminists 
alienate potential allies and ignore the real pain men experience under patriarchy. 
MRAs, on the other hand, need not take feminists’ focus on issues that directly affect 
women’s lives, such as, in the United States, access to abortion and contraception, as 
an indicator that feminists do not care about men.  
 Influenced by black feminists such as Audre Lorde and poststructuralist 
feminists like Butler, contemporary feminism recognizes that there is no such thing as 
a monolithic “female” experience or identity. The same is true of the category “male.” 
As I write this, men of color are being arrested and thrown in jail for minor offenses at 
much higher rates than their white male counterparts. Impoverished men are falling 
behind on child support payments that they literally cannot afford to pay. Somewhere, 
a gay teenager is gritting his teeth while his father casually uses the word “faggot.” 
Somewhere else, a man is beating his son. Feminism compels us to examine how 
inequality is sustained, and to examine the multiplicity of human experiences; it asks 
us to not only acknowledge, but to respect difference; above all, it asks us to be 
simultaneously critical and compassionate. In this way, we can allow ourselves to 
accept that even the most privileged of the privileged—white men—have a diversity of 
experiences, and that they, too, are hurt by patriarchal gender norms. This is not to 
equate their pain with more severe forms of oppression, or to suggest that their 
involvement is necessary for feminism’s legitimization. Rather, it is to say that they have 
something to contribute to our sociopolitical project, that they, too, can offer insights 
on inequality.  
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